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謝花林,金聲甜:Evolutionary Game Analysis of Fallow Farmland Behaviors of Different Types of Farmers and Local Governments
 
[發布時間:2019-09-07 10:43:10] [訪問量:]

SSCI期刊《Land Use Policy(IF=3.194). 2019, 88, 104122

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Fallow Farmland Behaviors of Different

Types of Farmers and Local Governments

Hualin Xie 1 , Shengtian Jin 1


Institute of Ecological Civilization, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China

 

Abstract:The fallowing of farmland is a basic system in China that allows the degraded farmland to recuperate and restore the ecological environment. However, during the implementation of the fallow policy, the fallow farmers may not be subsidized, the farmers may be subsidized but they are not fallowing, or the area of fallow may not have reached the expected target. To solve these problems, under the conditions of bounded rationality and in-formation asymmetry, this paper constructs evolutionary game models of different types of farmers and local governments, studies evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategies, and conducts simulation analysis. The results showed that (1) pure farmers and local governments cannot achieve ideal equilibrium through independent games, and the central government needs to supervise both sides. The fines need to be greater than the pure income of the farmers' crops and subsidies of local governments. (2) Only when part-time farmers use all their time to engage in other industries and earn more than the income from other industries while planting crops, the independent game can achieve an ideal balance. Otherwise, it is necessary to introduce the central government to supervise both parties. The fines need to be greater than the difference between the income of part-time farmers with or without fallows and the subsidies of the local government. (3) In the absence of external constraints, any non-farmers' strategy is evolutionary and stable. The local governments' evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategy are nonsubsidized. To ensure that non-farmers choose the fallow policy, the central government needs to supervise the fallow subsidies of local governments, and the fines need to be greater than the subsidies of local governments. (4) Some relevant policy implications are put forward. Including implementing differentiated fallow farmland supervision and punishment strategies, improving the performance appraisal system and accelerating the construction of township enterprises.

Keywords: Farmland; fallow; Evolutionary game; Land use; Farmer, Government

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